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Table	3:	DAA	Alert	Transition	Time	Alert	Transition	 Mean	Transition	Time	(s)	DAA	Preventive	to	DAA	Corrective	 3.2	s	DAA	Corrective	to	DAA	Warning	 24.9	s	DAA	Warning	to	Well	Clear	Recovery	 19.3	s	Well	Clear	Recovery	to	TCAS	 9.7	s		
DAA	TCAS	Interoperability	As	discussed	in	the	preceding	evaluation	criteria	compliance	section,	compliance	with	the	required	elements	of	the	DAA-TCAS	interoperability	concepts	was	largely	met,	with	few	exceptions	being	the	result	of	JADEM	software	implementation	issues.		Of	note,	two	scenarios	resulted	in	corrective	TCAS	RAs	while	JADEM	deemed	the	ownship	Well	Clear	of	the	intruder	with	green	banding	guidance	at	the	time	of	the	corrective	TCAS	RA.		Further	analysis	by	SC-228	personnel	and	TCAS-II	experts	concluded	that	such	“Well	Clear	RAs”	observed	in	FT4	are	the	result	of	incompatibility	between	DAA	Corrective	Alert	HMD	threshold	(0.75nm)	and	how	HMD	is	used	(or	in	this	case,	NOT	used)	to	filter	TCAS	RAs.		In	these	two	cases,	it	was	concluded	that	TCAS	did	not	consider	HMD	in	issuing	a	corrective	RA	due	to	the	close	proximity	of	the	intruder	and	the	expected	error	in	the	HMD	prediction.		Based	on	this	finding	and	consistent	observations	with	all	systems	under	test	in	FT4,	it	is	recommended	that	the	MOPS	Alerting	requirements	be	refined	to	consider	TCAS	employment	of	the	HMD	filter	and	to	mitigate	its	impact	on	alerting	performance.	
Mode	C	Intruder	Guidance	Stability	Analysis	of	JADEM	guidance	stability	for	intruders	lacking	ADS-B	equipment	was	considered	a	secondary	priority	of	the	data	analysis.		When	Mode	C	surveillance	is	the	only	available	bearing	source	for	the	DAA	system,	a	high	degree	of	bearing	uncertainty	is	to	be	expected.		Unfortunately,	only	three	FT4	JADEM	encounters	included	intruders	with	transponders	but	without	ADS-B	equipage.		Further,	the	JADEM	guidance	for	these	encounters	was	based	on	a	fusion	track	that	included	radar	surveillance	(i.e.,	has	low	bearing	error	within	the	radar	detection	range).		Thus,	while	the	observed	guidance	demonstrated	excellent	stability	for	these	three	encounters,	more	analysis	is	needed	to	draw	any	conclusions	about	the	stability	of	JADEM	DAA	guidance	for	Mode	C	Intruders.		However,	it	is	unclear	if	this	should	be	considered	a	priority	for	further	investigation	given	the	expectation	that	intruders	will	generally	be	within	radar	range	prior	to	the	prescribed	alerting	thresholds	(i.e.	bearing	error	is	not	expected	to	influence	DAA	alerting).	
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WCR	Performance	While	WCR	performance	met	the	objective	criteria	prescribed	in	the	scenario	evaluation	criteria,	FT4	UAS	pilot	participants	subjectively	assessed	WCR	performance	as	lacking	in	a	number	of	areas.		First,	WCR	guidance	stability	was	deemed	poor	for	intruders	lacking	ADS-B	equipage;	such	encounters	demonstrated	multiple	changes	in	the	WCR	guidance	direction	that	pilots	found	distracting	or	lacking	informative	value.		Second,	UAS	pilots	objected	to	WCR	guidance	that	prescribed	turns	to	headings	aft	of	the	current	UAS	course;	such	turns	would	require	significant	deviation	from	planned	route	of	flight,	would	result	in	significant	time	in	close	proximity	for	head-on	encounter	geometries,	and		often	place	non-cooperative	intruders	outside	the	surveillance	volume.		
Concluding	Remarks	and	Recommendations	FT4	provided	a	unique	opportunity	to	evaluate	the	performance	of	a	prototype	UAS	DAA	system	(NASA	JADEM)	across	a	range	of	encounter	conditions	and	in	a	realistic	flight	environment	including	surveillance	system	errors.		However,	as	with	all	flight	tests,	FT4	was	a	tightly	controlled	experiment	with	prior	pilot	knowledge	of	encounter	geometry	and	intruder	“escape”	procedures.		As	such,	while	the	performance	of	the	UAS	DAA	system	employed	in	FT4	is	evaluated	for	the	purpose	of	furthering	MOPS	development,	the	results	must	be	considered	in	the	context	of	FT4	and	in	combination	with	results	from	other	UAS	DAA	experiments	(e.g.	NASA	PT5	and	NASA	PT6,	where	the	UAS	pilots	had	no	advance	knowledge	of	encounters	and	intruder	actions).		However,	whereas	human-in-the-loop	simulations	use	models	of	aircraft	dynamics,	surveillance	sensors	and	atmospheric	phenomena,	flight	test	offers	a	glimpse	at	the	performance	of	the	prototype	UAS	DAA	system	under	real-world	conditions;	it	is	through	this	lens	that	the	performance	of	the	prototype	UAS	DAA	system	is	assessed.	DAA	system	performance	was	assessed	across	five	categories	of	metrics:	Alert	Timing,	UAS	DAA-TCAS	Interoperability,	Mode	C	Intruder	Alert	Stability,	Well	Clear	Recover	Performance	and	a	broad	set	of	Scenario	Evaluation	Criteria.	Observed	alert	lead	times	indicated	acceptable	UAS	DAA	alerting	performance;	mean	DAA	Corrective	and	DAA	Warning	alert	lead	times	were	46	and	23	seconds	respectively.		Excluding	encounters	that	included	turns	toward	the	intruder	(with	the	explicit	purpose	of	creating	immediate	TCAS	RAs),	the	DAA	Corrective	Alert	lead	time	increased	to	49	s.	These	mean	lead	times	are	consistent	with	(albeit	slightly	below)	the	MOPS	average	alert	lead	times	(Section	2.2.4.3.4.),	and	are	indicative	of	acceptable	alerting	thresholds	implemented	within	JADEM	for	FT4.	FT4	included	29	JADEM	scenarios	to	investigate	the	UAS	DAA-TCAS	interoperability	concept.		Results	indicate	effective	interoperability	across	the	range	of	test	conditions	with	one	notable	exception	case:	the	“Well	Clear	RA”.		Observed	for	a	small	number	of	scenarios	(and	across	all	systems	under	test),	UAS	pilots	were	presented	with	a	TCAS	RA	while	the	UAS	DAA	system	had	determined	the	intruder	to	be	Well	Clear.		It	was	determined	that	such	RAs	were	due	to	suppression	of	the	Horizontal	Miss	Distance	(HMD)	criterion	test	when	TCAS	deemed	the	intruder	bearing	information	to	be	of	insufficient	quality.		Because	TCAS	does	not	have	a	quality	bearing	surveillance	source	(e.g.	ADS-B	or	airborne	radar),	such	cases	are	to	be	expected,	and	it	is	recommended	further	analysis	be	conducted	to	determine	the	rate	of	occurrence	of	such	RAs	in	the	NAS	and	potential	mitigations,	if	needed.	Observations	on	the	stability	of	alerts	for	“Mode	C-only	Intruders”	were	limited	to	a	single	scenario	in	FT4.		As	such,	more	data	is	necessary	to	draw	firm	conclusions	on	the	acceptability	of	UAS	DAA	
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system	performance	for	such	intruders.	The	concern	regarding	alert	instability	for	Mode-C-only	intruders	stems	from	the	poor	bearing	information	derived	from	transponder	replies	alone.		However,	given	the	airborne	radar	equipage	requirement	and	typical	radar	detection	range,	it	is	unclear	if	such	intruders	represent	a	credible	concern	regarding	alerting	stability;	bearing	error	should	be	a	non-issue	once	the	intruder	is	within	radar	detection	range	.		Further	analysis	of	Mode	C	intruder	alert	stability	should	thus	consider	radar	detection	range	and	the	bearing	performance	of	an	integrated	intruder	track.	Nine	scenarios	were	conducted	to	assess	the	performance	of	UAS	DAA	Well	Clear	Recovery	(WCR)	guidance	to	the	UAS	pilot.		While	observations	indicated	effective	WCR	guidance	for	ADS-B	equipped	intruders,	guidance	was	deemed	largely	ineffective	for	other	intruders	for	a	number	of	reasons.		First,	UAS	pilots	indicated	(and	data	confirmed)	some	directional	instability	in	WCR	guidance;		it	is	recommended	that	additional	heuristics	and/or	hysteresis	be	included	in	WCR	logic	to	prevent	frequent	changes	in	the	directional	WCR	guidance.		Second,	WCR	guidance	occasionally	included	turns	well	beyond	90	degrees	from	the	current	course;		UAS	pilots	found	this	objectionable	and	ineffective.		It	is	recommended	that	WCR	directional	guidance	be	limited	to	turns	of	less	than	some	reasonable	bound	(e.g.	90	degrees	from	current	course).	Finally,	a	broad	set	of	scenario	evaluation	criteria	were	collected	to	assess	high-level	UAS	DAA	system	performance.		Compliance	with	scenario	evaluation	criteria	is	considered	indicative	of	acceptable	UAS	DAA	performance	.	FT4	JADEM	scenario	evaluation	criteria	compliance	exceeded	90%	and	non-compliances	were	assessed	to	be	either	test	artifacts	or	the	results	of	a	(since	corrected)	software	coding	error.		While	no	acceptance	threshold	for	evaluation	criteria	compliance	was	established,	the	observed	high	level	of	compliance	provides	anecdotal	evidence	for	requirements	validation	of	the	alerting	parameters	,	WCR	guidance	logic	and	TCAS	interoperability	concept	implemented	within	JADEM	for	FT4.		Finally,	it	is	important	to	reiterate	that	the	results	presented	herein	are	based	on	a	limited	set	of	scripted	scenarios	executed	in	a	tightly	controlled	flight	test	environment	with	well-rehearsed	and	limiting	pilot	procedures	for	use	of	the	system	under	test;	the	results,	conclusions	and	recommendations	included	in	this	document	provide	key	insights	and	anecdotal	evidence,	but	represent	a	small	fraction	of	the	analyses	necessary	to	fully	validate	the	SC-228	UAS	DAA	MOPS	requirements.	
